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Abstract 
This paper clarifies the key concepts of System 
Maturity, System Readiness and Capability Readiness 
and refines their definitions.  The authors have achieved 
this by analysing three high-profile defence projects as 
case studies. The following military based systems were 
chosen: Chinook Helicopter; Apache Helicopter; and 
the Type 45 Anti-Air Warfare Destroyer. 
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Introduction 
Systems are becoming increasingly complex due to 
the need to integrate with other systems to form 
systems of systems and networked systems of systems.  
Many systems are also software driven rather than 
mechanical driven adding to the level of complexity.  
You could therefore argue that it is not unsurprising 
that many systems, whether new or existing, still 
continue to cause unexpected and unacceptable 
behaviour even though they were considered to be 
“ready” for use.  Clearly, we are not proficient enough 
at understanding how systems should behave in the real 
world context and the „capability‟ expected of them.  
We need to be able to assess and measure, with 
confidence, a System‟s Maturity and Readiness within a 
development programme and overall lifecycle.  We 
need to have confidence in the use of existing 
„maturity‟ assessments and Readiness Levels as a 
systems engineering and project management tool to 
capture evidence and assess, measure and communicate 
a System‟s Maturity and Readiness in a reliable and 
consistent manner to stakeholders. 
The aim of this study is to clarify and refine the 
notions of „maturity‟ and „readiness‟ through case study 
analysis. 
This paper is structured as follows.  First, we 
describe the methodology used for this study and 
provide a short précis of the chosen case studies.  Then, 
we clarify and refine the notions of „maturity‟ and 
„readiness‟ using the evidence found from the case 
studies.  Finally, conclusions are drawn and the next 
stages of our research are provided in terms of 
recommendations for further research. 
Methodology 
The methodology used for this study was Case 
Studies.  We selected this particular approach to 
challenge theoretical work previously undertaken by 
(Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c); to allow for the in-depth 
exploration of solutions for complex issues identified 
by (Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c) within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 
2009); and benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions by (Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c) 
to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2009).  
We chose multiple case studies to allow us to make 
analytic generalisation and not for statistical 
generalisation (Robson 2002).  We hand-picked the 
following three case studies: Chinook Helicopter; 
Apache Helicopter; and the Type 45 Anti-Air Warfare 
Destroyer.  We specifically identified these case studies 
as being relevant to our research, because we wanted to 
examine both new and existing defence systems 
spanning a significant length of time (50-60 years) 
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developed by multiple defence contractors and sub-
contractors across the US, UK and Europe.  We 
specifically selected defence systems, because we are 
not looking at “maturity” or “capability” from a 
CMMISM (CMMISM 2008) process perspective as 
explained by (Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c), i.e. the 
process maturity of the capability, but in terms of the 
Operational Capability of the system or product, similar 
to the way the UK MoD looks at capability from a 
military operational capability perspective (MoD 
2008c,d). 
We now give the reader a synopsis of each of the 
three case studies as a way of providing background 
information about these high-profile military defence 
systems:  
Chinook Helicopter - The CH-47 Chinook 
Helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter 
designed for transportation of cargo, troops and 
weapons, during day, night, visual and instrument 
conditions.  Development of the medium lift Boeing 
Vertol (models 114 and 414) CH-47 Series Chinook 
began in 1956. Since then the effectiveness of the 
Chinook has been continually upgraded by successive 
product improvements: the CH-47A; CH-47B; CH-
47C; and CH-47D.  The amount of load a cargo 
helicopter can carry depends on the model, the fuel on 
board, the distance to be flown and atmospheric 
conditions (NAO 2008; FAS 2008; FAS 1999; Boeing 
2008a,b; FAS 1997). 
Apache Helicopter - The Apache Helicopter is a 
twin-engine army attack helicopter developed by 
McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing).  It entered service 
with the US Army in 1984 and has been exported to 
Egypt, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, Japan, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UK.  The 
US Army has more than 800 Apaches in service and 
more than 1,000 have been exported.  A consortium of 
GKN Westland (now AgustaWestland), Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Shorts bid a 
version of the Longbow Apache for the UK Army 
attack helicopter requirement which was selected in 
July 1995.  The first helicopter entered service in 
January 2001 designated as the Apache AH Mk1.  The 
UK Apache is fitted with RTM322 engines from Rolls-
Royce / Turbomeca (Net Resources International 
2009a; NAO 2002; Overkleeft 1996; Bond 1990; Slade 
2008; USGAO 2001). 
Type 45 Anti-Air Warfare Destroyer – The UK 
Royal Navy's Type 45 destroyers are to replace the 
Type 42 destroyers, in service since 1978.  Six Type 45 
destroyers have been contracted.  The destroyers are to 
enter service by 2014.  A full-scale engineering 
development and initial production (FSED/IP) contract 
has been placed on BAE Systems Marine as project 
prime contractor (NAO 2009a,b; Net Resources 
International 2009b; Scott 2006; Downs 2007). 
System Maturity 
We showed that there is not a sufficiently clear 
distinction between System Maturity and System 
Readiness.  Current definitions of Readiness Levels 
seem to assess System Maturity in order to determine 
System Readiness and they all refer to the key term of 
„maturity‟ in their definitions.  Based on this evidence, 
you could infer that the notion of „maturity‟ is 
encapsulated within the notion of „readiness‟ and they 
appear to be used interchangeably.  It could also be 
argued that the existing Readiness Levels actually 
provide a „maturity‟ metric as opposed to a „readiness‟ 
metric.  This is likely to lead to the confusion in the 
understanding of the terms of „maturity‟, i.e. System 
Maturity and „readiness‟, i.e. System Readiness in 
systems engineering and in the use of existing 
Readiness Levels (Tetlay and John 2009c). 
To address these issues, we suggested that 
clarification is required for the terms of System 
Maturity and System Readiness, because the potential 
use of these terms is very important.  They are directly 
linked to Risk, Progress and Fitness for Purpose.  The 
success of systems and system projects would benefit 
from a more meaningful and appropriate use of these 
concepts (Tetlay and John 2009c). 
One of the most recognised and frequently used 
existing Readiness Levels is NASA‟s Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) as illustrated in Figure 1.  
However, according to (Sauser et al., 2006) “TRL is not 
an end state to determining a system‟s readiness.  TRL 
is only a measure of an individual technology and not 
systems readiness. There is no proven, tested, 
systematic index of systems readiness” (Sauser et al., 
2006).  In fact, if you look carefully at the TRLs, you 
will notice that from TRL1 through to TRL8 they are 
all focusing on the design, development and testing 
aspect of the System Development and overall 
Lifecycle.  Although, we would argue that both TRL4 
and TRL5 are to do with verification and not validation 
of the subsystem as highlighted in yellow in Figure 1.  
Also, note that only TRL9 is focusing on the 
„operational‟ aspects of the system or product as 
highlighted in green in Figure 1.   
Based on this evidence, we have therefore used the 
System Development and overall Lifecycle “V-Model” 
to map a new set of System Maturity Levels across the 
system development part of the system engineering 
lifecycle as shown in Figure 2.  The left hand-side of 
the model focuses on the „Design Maturity‟ 
(consistency, completeness, coherence and confidence) 
for the system or product being engineered and the right 
hand-side concentrates on achieving verification, i.e. 
System Maturity.  The purpose of the System Maturity 
Levels is to determine where you are in the System 
Development Lifecycle which determines the degree of 
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System Maturity for the system or product currently 
being developed.  The left hand-side of the System 
Development Lifecycle is less „mature‟ than the right 
hand-side.  Obviously, the further you are in the System 
Development Lifecycle, moving from the left to the 
right hand-side, the closer you are towards achieving a 
physical system or product and therefore achieving 
System Maturity. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: NASA Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
 
In order to help clarify the notions of “maturity” 
(System Maturity) and “readiness” (System Readiness), 
we advocated that these terms and notions should be 
treated as two clear and distinct entities both of which 
are actually addressing two completely different 
questions within the System Development and overall 
Lifecycle.  To illustrate this argument, we mapped 
System Maturity and System Readiness against the 
System Development and overall Lifecycle as depicted 
in Figure 2.  We also provided definitions for both 
System Maturity and System Readiness (Tetlay and 
John 2009c).   
 
 
 
Figure 2: System Maturity Levels 
 
The new revised definition for System Maturity which 
takes into account the new System Maturity Levels is 
provided below.  
System Maturity is the verification within an iterative 
process of the System Development Lifecycle and 
occurs before System Readiness, i.e. the system or 
product must first be fully „mature‟ before it can be 
“ready” for use.  The process starts from System 
Requirements and finishes at System Verification.  
System Maturity asks the question: Do we have a 
complete, well defined design that has been 
implemented and verified, i.e. we have decided what 
we want to implement and we have achieved this; the 
designed system or product now physically exists (the 
long horizontal dotted-line between User Requirements 
and System Requirements in Figure 2 denotes the 
physical existence of the produced-engineered system 
or product and also separates System Maturity from 
System Readiness)?  System Maturity is both solution 
dependent and context specific.  The System 
Requirements implicitly determines the context of use.  
System Maturity is only concerned with the intrinsic 
aspects of the system or product, i.e. the system or 
product features.  Three phases or states of “System 
Maturity‟ could be envisaged:  
(1) System is Immature (SI) - In the System 
Requirements stage of the System Development 
Lifecycle or just completed it.  System Maturity Level 
is equal to 0;  
(2) System Maturity is in Progress (SMP) - Working 
your way through the System Development Lifecycle 
(for example, the design, development and testing part 
of the System Development Lifecycle) in order to 
decide and define the system design and bring it into 
physical existence.  This covers System Maturity 
Levels 1 to 5, inclusive; and  
(3) System Maturity has been Achieved (SMA) - The 
design, development and testing of the system or 
product is now complete, fully “mature” and tested and 
now physically exists.  To achieve System Maturity the 
system or product must be verified against the System 
Requirements, i.e. you have achieved System Maturity 
by building the system right based on „Best Practice‟ 
procedures and „Standards‟ in place.  This can only 
occur if all the Aspects of System Maturity (AoSM) are 
in place, i.e. the stages of the System Development 
Lifecycle (see Figure 4).  System Maturity Level is 
equal to 6.  
Verification confirms that the system element 
meets the design-to or build-to specifications. It 
answers the question “Did you build it right? 
(CMMISM 2008)”. 
We now provide some examples of System 
Maturity to further explain and clarify this important 
concept.  The following are all examples of systems or 
products failing to achieve System Maturity, because 
they have failed to build the systems or products based 
on „best practice‟ procedures and/or „standards‟ in 
place.  They also illustrate the importance of first 
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achieving System Maturity before you can achieve 
System Readiness, i.e. before the system or product can 
even be considered to be “ready” for use which is the 
„Fitness for Purpose‟ question:   
“The Chinook Mk3 helicopters have not flown on 
operations because the Department refused to grant the 
helicopters an airworthiness certificate. Although 
Boeing met its contractual obligations, the avionics 
software fell short of United Kingdom military 
airworthiness standards and the helicopters have not 
flown on operations” (NAO 2008); “By the time the 
airworthiness issues with the Chinook Mk3 helicopters 
became apparent, emerging legislation and operational 
requirements meant that the helicopters would need to 
be modified before they could be deployed on 
operations” (NAO 2008); “The Reversion project aims 
to deliver the eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters to a 
standard such that they can be deployable to 
Afghanistan in 2009-10” (NAO 2008); “The US 
Secretary of State requires all aircraft, associated 
equipment and software to be designed, constructed, 
maintained and operated in such a manner that they are 
airworthy” (NAO 2008); and “There is still some risk to 
the delivery of the Apache as development work to 
install a range of more recently contracted 
enhancements to the baseline helicopter has yet to be 
completed” (NAO 2002).  
The examples below demonstrate System Maturity 
as being solution dependent:  
“In September 2004 the Department decided to explore 
further a “Fix to Field” solution which involved the 
replacement or modification of the cockpit display 
systems, the communications systems and fuel quantity 
gauging, together with the integration of special 
operations equipment and a comprehensive Defensive 
Aids Suite” (NAO 2008); and “Each confirmed that the 
solution was technically feasible, had a sound approach 
to airworthiness and would enable the Chinook Mk3 to 
be declared an operationally effective helicopter to be 
used on special operations” (NAO 2008). 
The following example shows that System 
Maturity is only concerned with the intrinsic aspects of 
the system or product, i.e. the system or product 
features:  
“Three Chinook airframes, CH-47A, CH-47B, and a 
CH-47C, were stripped down to their basic airframes 
and then rebuilt with improved systems to provide three 
CH-47D prototypes. Improvements included upgraded 
power plants, rotor transmissions, integral lubrication 
and cooling for the transmission systems, and fiberglass 
rotor blades. Other improvements included a redesigned 
cockpit to reduce pilot workload, redundant and 
improved electrical systems, modularized hydraulic 
systems, an advanced flight control system, and 
improved avionics” (FAS 2008).  
In order to achieve System Maturity a system or 
product must be verified against the System 
Requirements.  The following are examples of System 
Requirements: 
“The fuel cells must be crash-worthy and self sealing 
up to 50 caliber hits” (FAS 2008); and “Type 45 shall 
carry a Medium Calibre Gun System of at least 
114mm” (NAO 2009a,b). 
The following is an example of Design which is 
Immature leading to increased risk and uncertainty: 
“The Department and its commercial partners were 
over-optimistic in their predictions of the time and 
resources required to procure the first six ships, and did 
not establish the project on a suitable basis given the 
levels of risk and uncertainty and the immaturity of the 
design of the ships and the PAAMS missile system” 
(NAO 2009a,b). 
However, the following is an example of Design 
which is Mature.  Note that the design is able to cope 
with new requirements, including Urgent Operational 
Requirements (UOR) and requirements which have yet 
to be determined: 
“The Type 45 could also accommodate cruise missiles 
such as the Tomahawk and anti-ballistic missiles if a 
requirement was identified in future” (Net Resources 
International 2009b).  
System Readiness 
We highlighted a number of issues with existing 
Readiness Levels and one of the issues is that existing 
Readiness Levels seem to assess System Maturity in 
order to determine System Readiness and they all refer 
to the key term of „maturity‟ in their definitions (Tetlay 
and John 2009c).  We also suggested that existing 
Readiness Levels actually provide a „maturity‟ metric 
as opposed to a „readiness‟ metric.  This is likely to lead 
to the confusion in the understanding of these terms and 
in their practical use (Tetlay and John 2009c).  We will 
use System Readiness Levels (SRLs) (MoD 2008a,b) 
which are depicted in Figure 3 to further illustrate this 
issue.  The following text defines SRLs (MoD 2008a,b) 
and is also shown in Figure 3: “System Readiness 
Levels (SRLs) have been developed as a project 
management tool to capture evidence, and assess and 
communicate System Maturity in a consistent manner 
to stakeholders.  SRLs define a set of nine maturity 
steps from Concept to in-service across a set of systems 
engineering disciplines” (MoD 2008a,b).  We can 
clearly see that the intention is to assess System 
Maturity and not System Readiness despite the fact that 
these are System Readiness Levels and not System 
Maturity Levels.  In the example shown in Figure 3, the 
Project is at SRL3 or do they really mean the Project is 
at SML 3, i.e. System Maturity Level 3? 
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Figure 3: System Readiness Levels (SRLs) 
 
The new revised definition for System Readiness which 
takes into account the findings from the case study 
analysis is provided below.  
System Readiness is the validation aspect of the system 
development and overall lifecycle and occurs after 
System Maturity, i.e. the system or product must first 
be fully „mature‟ before it can be made “ready” for use.  
The process starts from User Requirements and 
finishes at System Validation. System Readiness 
determines whether or not the system or product is now 
“ready” for use in its intended operational 
environment.  System Readiness is a relative metric 
based on context and use, i.e. the „Fitness for Purpose‟ 
question.  System Readiness is context dependent.  
The User Requirements explicitly determine the context 
of use.  System Readiness is solution independent, i.e. 
users do not care about the solution, only whether or 
not the system or product is “ready” for use.  System 
Readiness is only concerned with the extrinsic aspects 
of the system or product, i.e. is the system or product 
now “ready” to be used in the real-world context?  
System Readiness is dependent on Enablers and 
Barriers.  Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) can be 
used to assess and measure the system‟s or product‟s 
effectiveness.  To achieve System Readiness the system 
or product must be validated against the User 
Requirements, i.e. you will achieve System Readiness 
by building the right system or product for a given 
context.  Three phases or states of “System Readiness‟ 
could be envisaged:  
(1) No System Readiness (NSR) – Certain enablers for 
the system or product for a particular context are not 
currently in place and certain barriers are also 
preventing the system or product from being 
operational and “ready” for use; conceptually, this can 
be thought of as System Readiness being equal to 0; 
(2) Initial System Readiness (ISR) - Certain enablers 
for the system or product for a particular context are 
currently in place, but certain barriers are preventing 
the system or product from being fully operational and 
therefore the system or product only has limited 
operational use for a particular context, but is “ready” 
for use for that context only; conceptually, this can be 
thought of as System Readiness being equal to 1; and 
(3) Full System Readiness (FSR) – All the enablers for 
the system or product for a particular context are 
currently in place and none of the current barriers are 
preventing the system or product from being fully 
operational and the system or product has full 
operational use for a particular context and is “ready” 
for use for that context only; conceptually, this can be 
thought of as System Readiness being equal to 2.  
Validation answers the question of “Did you build 
the right thing? (CMMISM 2008)”. Note that this 
question is implicitly context dependent, i.e. „right for 
what‟?  
 
 
 
Figure 4: System Readiness Model 
 
We have created a conceptual model entitled, 
“System Readiness Model” as depicted in Figure 4 to 
try and capture the notion of „maturity‟ (System 
Maturity) and „readiness‟ (System Readiness).  As you 
can see in Figure 4, we have taken the system 
development stages of the System Development and 
overall Lifecycle and labelled these as Aspects of 
System Maturity (AoSM) which need to be in place to 
achieve System Maturity and we have labelled the left 
hand-side of the System Maturity part of the model as 
„Design Maturity‟ and the right hand-side as „System 
Maturity‟.  Sitting above System Maturity is System 
Readiness showing all the component parts of System 
Readiness.  In order to determine System Readiness of 
a system or product that depends on whether or not the 
system or product can be „validated‟ against the User 
Requirements and is dependent on the Enablers and 
Barriers as well as the context of use.  Measures of 
Effectiveness (MoE) could be used to assess and 
measure the degree of System Effectiveness (Verma et 
al., 2003). 
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We now provide some examples of System 
Readiness to further explain and clarify this important 
concept.  The following are all examples of System 
Readiness, because they are concerned with how the 
system or product is likely to behave in its intended 
operational environment for a given context: 
“...speed for any mission will vary greatly depending on 
load configuration (internal or external), time of day, or 
weather conditions” (FAS 2008); “The amount of load 
a cargo helicopter can carry depends on the model, the 
fuel on board, the distance to be flown, and atmospheric 
conditions” (FAS 2008); “The Chinook's primary 
mission is moving artillery, ammunition, personnel, and 
supplies on the battlefield. It also performs rescue, 
aeromedical, parachuting, aircraft recovery and special 
operations missions” (FAS 2008); “Chinooks (CH-
47D) can fly more than 150 mph at full load more than 
330 nautical miles with longrange fuel tanks. With a 
crew of three, the CH47s can transport 44 seated troops 
or 24 casualty litters” (Boeing 2008a,b); and “Daring 
will be able to transit 7,000 n miles at a speed of 18 kt 
and reach a maximum speed of more than 27 kt” (NAO 
2002). 
The following are examples of System Readiness, 
but in particular, Initial System Readiness (ISR) due 
to certain Enablers and/or certain Barriers in 
existence: 
“The helicopters can fly but are restricted to flying on 
cloudless days above 500 feet where the pilot can 
navigate via landmarks” (NAO 2008); “...the limitation 
aspects of operating the aircraft that are applicable to 
the aircraft systems, rather than flying the aircraft. Thus 
it covers items such as: Engine, Fuel System, Electrical 
System, Autopilot, Communications, and Radar” (NAO 
2008); “Without their primary weapons systems these 
Type 42s could not be deployed in an air defence role”. 
(NAO 2009a,b); and “...the Army determined that 
aircraft (Chinook CH-47D) with certain gear and 
bearing assemblies can continue training and perform 
operational missions that are limited to 80 percent, 
dual-engine torque” (FAS 1999). 
The following example illustrates the importance 
of User Requirements in achieving System Readiness, 
i.e. in order to achieve System Readiness a system or 
product needs to be validated against the User 
Requirements: 
“When it is in service, each Type 45 destroyer should 
have met all of its key user requirements” (NAO 
2009a,b); and “On current plans, Daring, the first of 
class will enter service in December 2009, when it will 
meet all its defined Key User Requirements... (NAO 
2009a,b). 
The following is an example of a User 
Requirement: 
“Type 45 shall be able to provide close tactical control 
to at least four, fixed wing or groups of, aircraft” (NAO 
2009a,b). 
The following is an excellent example of where a 
system or product has achieved System Readiness, but 
not necessarily Capability Readiness which we will 
discuss in the next section: 
“On current plans, Daring, the first of class will enter 
service in December 2009, when it will meet all its 
defined Key User Requirements.  There are, however, a 
number of risks both to achieving these dates and to 
delivering the full capability in the longer term.  In the 
short term these include integrating the destroyer and 
PAAMS; and trialling and operating the Combat 
Management System” (NAO 2009a,b). 
Capability Readiness 
Many systems, whether new or existing, still 
continue to cause unexpected and unacceptable 
behaviour even though they were considered to be 
“ready” for use.  Clearly, we are not proficient enough 
at understanding how systems should behave in the real 
world context and the „capability‟ expected of them. 
It is important to note that we are not looking at 
„capability‟ from a CMMISM (CMMISM 2008) 
process perspective as explained in (Tetlay and John 
2009a,b,c), i.e. the maturity of the capability, but in 
terms of the Operational Capability of the system or 
product, similar to the way the UK MoD looks at 
capability from a military operational capability 
perspective (MoD 2008c,d).  
We suggested that just because a system or product 
is now considered to be “ready” for use in its intended 
operational environment, does not necessarily mean 
that the system‟s or product‟s „capability‟ is also ready.  
Therefore, the concept of “Readiness”, i.e. System 
Readiness may be further expanded and related to 
„capability‟, i.e. Capability Readiness (Tetlay and John 
2009a,b,c).  
We first coined the term “Capability Readiness” in 
(Tetlay and John 2009c) and then extended the 
definition in (Tetlay and John 2009a,b).  We mapped 
„Capability Requirements‟ at the very beginning of the 
V-Model as illustrated in Figure 2 and before User 
Requirements which has traditionally been the starting 
point of the model.  The premise for this is to ensure 
that we capture the full “complete” requirements 
starting from and including the „Capability 
Requirements‟ which we need to build and factor into 
the System Development and overall Lifecycle (Tetlay 
and John 2009c).   
The new revised definition for Capability 
Readiness which takes into account the findings from 
the case study analysis is provided below.  
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Capability Readiness determines whether or not the 
„total-wider system or product‟, including Systems of 
Systems (SoS) and Networked Systems of Systems, for 
example, Networked Enabled Capability (NEC) has the 
ability and the capacity to completely fulfil the 
operational capability of the system or product for a 
given context in its intended operational 
environment, within the scope of the Capability 
Requirements and its aims and objectives. Once we 
know that the system or product has achieved System 
Readiness then we can raise the Capability Readiness 
question.  Like System Readiness, Capability Readiness 
is also looking at the validation of the system or 
product and is also context dependent.  The process 
starts at Capability Requirements and finishes at 
Capability Validation.  The Capability Requirements 
explicitly determine the context of use.  To achieve 
Capability Readiness the system or product must be 
validated against the Capability Requirements, i.e. you 
will achieve Capability Readiness if you can 
“demonstrate” that the system or product does have the 
ability and the capacity to completely fulfil the 
operational capability of the system or product for its 
intended operational environment as prescribed by the 
Capability Requirements.  Capability Readiness is a 
relative metric based on context and use, i.e. the 
„Fitness for Purpose‟ question.   Capability Readiness 
is solution independent, i.e. users do not care about the 
solution, only whether or not the system‟s or product‟s 
capability is “ready” for use.  Capability Readiness is 
only concerned with the extrinsic aspects of the system 
or product, i.e. is the system‟s or product‟s capability 
now “ready” to be used in the real-world context?  
Capability Readiness is dependent on Enablers and 
Barriers.  Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) can be 
used to assess and measure the system‟s or product‟s 
operational capability effectiveness.  Capability 
therefore translates to the system‟s or product‟s 
“Ability” (actual/physical behaviour) and “Capacity” 
(assumed/predicted „potential‟ behaviour) to achieve a 
need as depicted in Figure 5.  In terms of the 
assessment and measurement of Capability Readiness, 
this consists of three things: the „assumed‟ (based on 
assumptions, conjecture and anecdotal evidence), 
„predicted‟ (based on historical evidence; development 
of a prototype/simulation for example) and „actual‟ 
(based on current, physical/real-life and real-time) 
result of the behavioural aspects of a system or product 
using both qualitative (non-formal methods) and 
quantitative (formal methods) techniques (Tetlay and 
John 2009a,b).  When looking at Capability Readiness, 
it is important to recognize the „total-wider system or 
product‟ and to distinguish this from the „produced-
engineered system or product‟ which is composed of 
conventional development as illustrated in Figure 2 
above (Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Capability Readiness Definition 
 
This is a key distinction between „Capability 
Readiness‟ and „System Readiness‟.  System Readiness 
is only concerned with the „produced-engineered 
system or product‟, whereas Capability Readiness is 
concerned with the „total-wider system or product‟ (the 
long horizontal dotted-line at the very top of the 
diagram in Figure 2 above between Capability 
Requirements and User Requirements separates and 
distinguishes System Readiness from Capability 
Readiness) (Tetlay and John 2009a,b,c).  Three phases 
or states of “Capability Readiness‟ could be envisaged:   
(1) No Capability Readiness (NCR) – Certain enablers 
for the system or product for a particular context are not 
currently in place and certain barriers are also 
preventing the system‟s or product‟s capability from 
being operational and “ready” for use; conceptually, 
this can be thought of as Capability Readiness being 
equal to 0; 
(2) Initial Capability Readiness (ICR) - Certain enablers 
for the system or product for a particular context are 
currently in place, but not all of them and certain 
barriers are preventing the system‟s or product‟s 
capability from being fully operational and therefore 
the system or product only has limited operational 
capability for a particular context, but is “ready” for 
use for that context only; conceptually, this can be 
thought of as Capability Readiness being equal to 1; 
and 
(3) Full Capability Readiness (FCR) – All the enablers 
for the system or product for a particular context are 
currently in place and none of the current barriers are 
preventing the system‟s or product‟s capability from 
being fully operational and the system or product has 
full operational capability for a particular context and 
is “ready” for use for that context only; conceptually, 
this can be thought of as Capability Readiness being 
equal to 2.  
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We have created a conceptual model entitled, 
“Capability Readiness Model” as depicted in Figure 6 
to try and capture the notion of „capability‟ (Capability 
Readiness).  As you can see in Figure 6, we have taken 
the Defence Lines of Development (DLoD) (MoD 
2008c,d) as a basis of our model.  All the DLoD need to 
be in place to achieve Operational Capability, but in 
order to determine the Capability Readiness of a system 
or product that depends on whether or not the system or 
product can be „validated‟ against the Capability 
Requirements and is dependent on the Enablers and 
Barriers as well as the context of use.  Measures of 
Effectiveness (MoE) could be used to assess and 
measure the degree of Operational Capability (Verma et 
al., 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Capability Readiness Model 
 
We now provide some examples of Capability 
Readiness to further explain and clarify this important 
concept.  The following are all examples of Capability 
Readiness, because they are concerned with how the 
system‟s or product‟s capability is likely to behave in 
their intended operational environment for a given 
context: 
“Assuming an appropriate level of pilots and logistic 
support, additional Chinook flying hours could have 
been used to carry out operations with greater flexibility 
including more non-essential military tasks in support 
of the international mission in Afghanistan” (NAO 
2008); “Past experiences of operating in a desert 
environment have resulted in restricted operations and 
reduced engine life”. (FAS 1997); and “The new Type 
45 Carriers and its aircraft are planned to be capable of 
operating in all weathers, day and night, flying strike 
missions, conducting offensive support for ground 
forces ashore and where necessary, providing force 
protection to the fleet. The Aircraft Carrier will also be 
capable of supporting the operation of helicopters in a 
wide variety of roles including land attack and ground 
support” (NAO 2009a,b). 
The following examples focus on the DLoD and 
their importance in providing operational capability: 
“...risks remain to be overcome on a number of Lines of 
Development before the Apache can be successfully 
introduced into service” (NAO 2002); “...the 
infrastructure should be in place for delivery of the 
initial capability” (NAO 2002); “...the delivery of 
Apache training has been delayed which has in turn 
delayed introduction of the capability” (NAO 2002); 
“The Department is bringing in the capability taking 
into account the Defence Lines of Development.  This 
approach aims to ensure that all elements of the 
capability such as the necessary training and 
infrastructure, not just the ships themselves, are 
introduced coherently” (NAO 2009a,b); and “There are, 
however, some issues with the first four of the Defence 
Lines of Development that may limit the deployable 
capability if the Department‟s mitigating actions are not 
successful” (NAO 2009a,b).  
The following are examples of Capability 
Readiness, but in particular, Initial Capability 
Readiness (ICR) due to lack of certain Enablers and 
current Barriers preventing full operational capability: 
“The hot mountainous conditions of Vietnam limited 
the Ch-47A models performance capabilities and 
generated a requirement for increased payload and 
better performance” (FAS 2008); “Clearance of the 
aircraft to operate in conditions of ice is targeted for 
December 2006” (NAO 2002); “...clearance for the 
Apache to operate in conditions of snow is planned for 
August 2003 and to operate in ice conditions is targeted 
for December 2006.  This timescale means there will 
initially be some restrictions on the environments in 
which the aircraft can operate when it is introduced into 
service in 2004” (NAO 2002); “Because of the limited 
capability of other equipment the Apache will not, 
however, have the capacity for secure voice 
communications with the United Kingdom's Gazelle, 
Lynx, Sea King Mark 4 and Puma helicopters, nor will 
it be able to exchange data securely with most of the 
United Kingdom's military aircraft or the other 
battlefield helicopters or with United Kingdom ground 
forces” (NAO 2002); “Apache and Merlin Helicopters 
were deployed on operations before reaching full 
operating capability.  Both have proved to be successful 
on those operations, Apache in Afghanistan, and the 
RAF version of Merlin in Iraq” (Slade 2008); “The 
delays on the Type 45 destroyer project mean that the 
Department is still actively operating five Type 42 
destroyers which offer a much more limited capability” 
(NAO 2009a,b); and “...several pieces of equipment 
will be fitted to the destroyers incrementally after they 
come into service meaning that the full capability will 
not be available until the middle of the next decade” 
(NAO 2009a,b). 
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The following example is of Capability Readiness, 
but in particular, Full Capability Readiness (FCR): 
“The full capability - a true integrated and joint 
capability that would allow the Apache to be based and 
supported at sea with an Amphibious Task Force for 
extended periods and in more demanding sea conditions 
- remains the final objective” (NAO 2002).  
The following example illustrates the importance 
of Capability Requirements in achieving Capability 
Readiness, i.e. in order to achieve Capability Readiness 
a system or product needs to be validated against the 
Capability Requirements: 
 “Deliver agreed capability against approved 
requirements” (NAO 2002). 
The following are examples of Capability 
Requirements: 
“The Department is aiming to deliver at this point a 
capability that will allow the Apache to be re-fuelled 
and re-armed at sea and then fly to operations on land” 
(NAO 2002); “...escort, ground suppression and 
armoured reconnaissance. ...operate from ships of the 
Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary” (Slade 2008); 
and “...be able to operate Lynx, Merlin and Chinook 
helicopters. ...to operate in a hostile environment, either 
to provide a protective umbrella over a force of landing 
ships, an aircraft carrier or a group of merchant ships, 
or to conduct a wide range of other tasks such as 
maintaining a United Kingdom presence, embargoes or 
supporting forces ashore” (NAO 2009a,b). 
Conclusions 
This study clarifies the concept and notion of 
System Maturity, System Readiness and Capability 
Readiness, including refinement of their definitions 
based on the evidence obtained from the following 
three high-profile defence projects as Case Studies: 
Chinook Helicopter; Apache Helicopter; and the Type 
45 Anti-Air Warfare Destroyer. 
This study also introduced a new set of System 
Maturity Levels and a conceptual model for System 
Readiness and Capability Readiness. 
Further Research 
Further research is required to put the „theory‟ into 
„practice‟.  We aim to do this in two stages: first, to 
create a theoretical conceptual Framework based on the 
results obtained from the case study analysis and from 
our previous research and secondly, to apply and test 
the Framework against a real world system engineering 
project and then refine the Framework, as appropriate, 
for wider use and applicability.  This is part of our on-
going research. 
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